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REFORMATION AND THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE
George E. Palmer*
parol evidence rule of itself is never an obstacle to reformation, provided there is satisfactory evidence of a mistake in
integration.1 If the parties intend to express the terms of a transaction in a writing, which is then to be looked to as the sole repository of those terms, the longstanding tradition of the law courts,
described as the parol evidence rule, has been that the writing is
controlling. If through mistake the ·writing failed to express correctly
what the parties meant to express, the law courts still regarded the
written word as decisive, but it has been recognized for a long time
that equity will give relief through correction of the writing. Certainly by 1801,2 if not earlier, it was settled in English law that the
parol evidence rule did not bar reformation in equity. Nonetheless,
there remains a certain amount of confusion due to the occasional
failure to distinguish between the parol evidence rule and the statute
of frauds. 8 There are cases refusing reformation through the use of
"parol evidence" which might be thought to rest on an application
of the parol evidence rule when in fact the reason for denying relief
was the statute of frauds.4
As just seen, one effect of the parol evidence rule is that it gives
rise to the need for reformation, as a means of achieving enforcement
of the actual agreement, where there has been a mistake in integration. The fact that the rule does not prevent reformation provides
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1. In innumerable decisions courts have said that the case for reformation must be
established by "clear and convincing evidence." Day v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67
F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1933); Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 58, 80 A.2d 381 (1951); Broida v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 Atl. 492 (1934); Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G.
W.R.R., 118 Utah 41, 233 P.2d 699 (1951); l3ergstrom v. Olson, 39 Wash. 2d 536,
236 P.2d 1052 (1951).
2. Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328, 332-38, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1077-79 (Ch.
1801), per Lord Eldon. To refuse reformation, Story wrote, "would be to allow an act,
originating in innocence, to operate ultimately as a fraud, by enabling the party, who
receives the benefit of the mistake, to resist the claims of justice, under the shelter
of a rule [the parol evidence rule] framed to promote it." 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRU·
DENCE § 155 (3d ed. 1843).
l!. The effect of the statute of frauds is considered in Palmer, Reformation and the
Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1967).
4. An example is Le Witt v. Park Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 103 Conn. 285, 130 Atl. 387
(1925). The case is cited in 35 YALE L.J. 739, 740 (1926), as denying reformation because
of the parol evidence rule, but a careful study of the opinion makes it clear that the
statute of frauds was regarded as the stumbling block.
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a perspective for assessment of the rule, and this is a principal purpose of the present article. The availability of reformation raises
serious doubts as to the wisdom of some common applications of the
rule.
I.

THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE

p AROL'

EVIDENCE RULE

There is considerable difference between the parol evidence
rule as stated by some of the leading text writers and as applied by
most courts. The rule formulated by Wigmore has been stated as
follows: "Any or all parts of a transaction prior to or contemporaneous with a writing intended to record them finally are superseded
and made legally ineffective by the writing." 5 In Vligmore's view
the question whether the writing was a final and exclusive embodiment of the transaction or of some part of it "depends wholly upon
the intent of the parties ... [to] be sought where always intent must
be sought, namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and
the surrounding circumstances." 6 Stated boldly, this means that if
the trier of the facts finds that the parties made an oral agreement
and intended it to be effective, it is effective even though it adds
to, varies, qualifies or contradicts the terms of the ·writing, since a
finding that the extrinsic agreement was intended to be effective
despite the writing is also a finding that the writing was not intended to displace that agreement. Among contemporary writers
Corbin has been the most effective advocate of this view. His central
position is perhaps best summed up in his statement: "The 'parol
evidence rule' does not itself purport to establish the fact of 'integration'; and until that fact is established the 'rule' does not purport
to have any legal operation." 7 This general conception seems to have
5. Chadbourn &: McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L.
R.Ev. 151, 152 (1930). Dean McCormick's views on the rule are stated more fully in
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE ch. 24 (1954), and in McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a
Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
6. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
7. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 581 (1950). See also id. §§ 576, 582 and 583, as well as Cor•
bin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944). Williston was not prepared to go
this far, although his general formulation of the rule followed Wigmore in making
integration tum on the intent of the parties. 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAc:rs §§ 632, 633, 636,
638 (rev. ed. 1936). In § 636 he wrote: "If the parties never adopt,!d the writing as a
statement of the whole agreement, the rule does not exclude pare,! evidence of additional promises." In § 633, however, discussing the sources available for determining this
question, he spoke with apparent approval of the cases holding that "the contract must
appear on its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol evi:lence of additional
terms." The text of § 633 remains the same in the current edition of Williston (3d
ed. 1961), but a change in paragraphing may distort his meaning. Williston's views
are reflected in REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 229, 230, 237 (1932). The difference between
the Wigmore-Corbin view and the view expressed in the Restater.wnt is discussed in
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 396-400 (1962).
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been adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code, which makes the
issue turn on whether the writing was "intended by the parties as a
final expression of their agreement with respect to" the terms that
are in question. 8
Certainly there are many decisions that do not support this
conception of the rule. In countless cases the extrinsic evidence has
been rejected out of hand, merely on the ground that it "varies the
terms of the writing," 9 without inquiry into whether the writing
was intended to be a complete and accurate embodiment of the
agreement. 1° Frequently it is recognized that the intention of the
parties is in theory controlling, but explicitly or otherwise the court
holds that the writing itself is conclusive on the issue: an appearance
of completeness is regarded as decisive. 11 It is on this point perhaps
that most of the difference of opinion occurs in modern decisions.
Some judges have followed Wigmore's view that the ·writing does
not speak conclusively for itself, 12 whereas others adhere to the view
expressed by the New York court in Higgs v. de Mazirofj, 13 that an
appearance of completeness means "the contract was as a matter of
law integrated in the writings."
The effect of the position taken by the New York court will often
be to enforce a contract differing from the actual agreement, as
occurred in the Higgs case. In connection with a loan from the
plaintiff, the defendant executed promissory notes with fixed due
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE § 2-202. It is debatable whether the language quoted
in the text is meant to permit direct contradiction of a written term which the
parties did not intend to be an accurate expression of their actual agreement. This is
the situation in Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943) (discussed in
text accompanying note 18 infra), and Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951)
(discussed in text accompanying note 29 infra). If the propriety of such a contradiction
was contemplated it would have been better to provide: "intended by the parties as a
final and accurate expression etc." Still, as a question of interpretation of the statutory
language, it is arguable that a written term knowingly made inaccurate is not a
• "final expression" of the agreement with respect to that term. But McCormick reads
the Code as making the writing conclusive with respect to the terms embodied therein.
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 432-33 (1954). See also Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner,
26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966), noted in 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1370 (1966).
9. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2431 (3d ed. 1940).
IO. Cases are cited in 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S §§ 573, 582 (1950).
11. Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893); Thompson v. Libby, 34
Minn. 374, 26 N.W. I (1885); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331 (Ct. App. 1882); Mitchill
v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928); Hayden v. Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, lll Atl. 343
(1920). Other cases are cited in 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S § 582 (1950); 4 WILLISTON, CON•
TRACI'S § 633 (3d ed. 1961). The New York cases are collected in a study by Professor
Edwin Patterson for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No.
65C, at 265-66 (1955).
12. Brown v. Oliver, 123 Kan. 711, 256 Pac. 1008 (1927); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S §§ 581,
582 (1950).
13. 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E. 555 (1934); accord, Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach.
Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co., 125 Fed. llO (3d Cir. 1903).
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dates and delivered paintings to the plaintiff as security, under a
written contract that spelled out the details of the security arrangement. When the defendant was sued on the notes his defense was a
contemporaneous oral agreement that the notes would not be enforced until the paintings were sold, an event which had not occurred. The trial court found there was such an agreement and held
it was a defense, but this was reversed on appeal without questioning
the findings of fact.

II. THE Two

BASIC SITUATIONS: MISTAKE AND

INTENTIONAL OMISSION

The important substantive issue today is the extent to which the
parol evidence rule prevents enforcement of the actu:1.1 agreement,1-i
especially when the consequence is to give effect to a contract differing from that actual agreement.15 The time has come to eliminate
such consequences. Although some courts16 and writers17 are prepared to do so, it must be recognized that this goe·s further than
most courts are willing to go. A crucial test is provided by the facts
of Zell v. American Seating Co.,18 where the Second Circuit applied
Wigmore's conception of the rule. According to the plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true for purposes of decision, the defendant orally
agreed to pay him $1,000 a month for his service, in procuring
national defense contracts, and also agreed to pay him a minimum
commission of three per cent on the "purchase price" of any contracts so procured. Thereafter a written contract was signed which
appeared "on its face to embody a complete agreement between" the
parties, but which omitted the agreement for a commission and
14. A few examples of this result are as follows: Cargill Comm'n Co. v. F. A. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 198 N.W. 536 (1924); Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646
(1928); Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924).
15. In one sense this is perhaps true of all refusals to give dfect to the actual
agreement, but it becomes most apparent in a case such as Grubb v. Rockey, 866 Pa.
592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951), where, in a suit by the purchaser, a contract for the sale of
land was specifically enforced at a price of $10,000, despite the trial court's finding
that the price actually agreed on was $11,200. The vendor's evidence was that the
lower figure was inserted in the writing to conceal the true price from the purchaser's
family. The case is discussed in the text accompanying note 29 infra.
In Ferry v. Stephens, 66 N.Y. 321 (1876), the result of applying the parol evidence
rule was to grant specific performance of a contract for the sale of land when, if the
defendant's evidence was believed, there was no contract. The defendant's evidence was
that the recital of consideration was a sham, that he intended to make a gift, but that
the gift was ineffective for want of delivery.
16. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709
(1944). See also Jarvis v. Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 99 A.2d 126 (1953).
17. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 576, 581-83 (1950); Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4
ORE. L. REv. 91 (1925); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (1952).
18. 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943).
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stated that the $1,000 monthly payment was plaintiff's full compensation.19 The plaintiff alleged that the commission arrangement was
intended to be effective but was omitted from the writing because
of the defendant's apprehension of "adverse comments ... made in
Congress of such contingent-fee arrangements in connection with
war contracts." Through the plaintiff's efforts contracts were obtained on which he would have been entitled to approximately
$178,000 in commissions under the oral agreement, and suit was
brought to recover this amount after the defendant refused to pay.
The Second Circuit, Judges L. Hand, Swan and Frank sitting, held
that plaintiff could recover on the oral agreement if it were estabblished. The parol evidence rule was no bar since it does not apply
where "it has been proved by extrinsic evidence that the parties did
not intend [the writing] to be an exclusive authoritative memorial
of their agreement." 20 The judgment was reversed by the Supreme
Court in a per curiam opinion stating that seven justices had voted
for reversal, four because the plaintiff's proof was precluded by the
parol evidence rule, three because the commission agreement was
contrary to public policy and void. 21
The oral agreement in the Zell case directly contradicted the
terms of the writing, and it is here undoubtedly that a court is most
likely to hold that the writing controls as a matter of law.22 Yet a
19. The written contract provided that the monthly payment "will be full compensation, but the company may, if it desires, pay you something in the nature of a
bonus." Id. at 642.
20. Id. at 643.
21. American Seating Co. v. Zell, 322 U.S. 709 (1944).
22, Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); Dalzell, TwentyFive Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina, 33 N.CL. R.Ev. 420, 428 (1955). In a
somewhat ambivalent discussion of the question whether a court may go behind an
appearance of completeness, Williston wrote:
Even if the oral agreement is repugnant to the writing, what was orally
agreed would be of equal importance with what was written, since its existence
would prove that there was no complete integration of the contract in regard to
the matter to which it related. The parol evidence rule would then be of importance only as establishing a presumption that prior and contemporaneous oral
agreements and negotiations were merged in the writing, but the practical value
of the rule would be much impaired if either party to a writing were allowed
to rebut the presumption by proof of any contemporaneous oral agreement.
Certainly the law does not permit this.
3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633 (rev. ed. 1936).
The "law" was prepared to permit this two centuries ago in Pitcairn v. Ogboume, 2
Ves. Sr. 376, 28 Eng. Rep. 1079 (Ch. 1751). On the marriage of his son the plaintiff
executed an "annuity-bond" promising to pay £ 150 per annum to the husband and
wife. Later he sued "to be relieved" on the bond and introduced evidence to show
that the actual agreement was for an annuity.of£ 100, the larger figure having been
inserted in order to induce the bride's uncle to make a more generous provision for
her. The court was prepared to grant relief except for the fact that it regarded the
plaintiff as party to a fraudulent scheme and therefore not entitled to the aid of a
court of equity.
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comparison of the results achieved through reformation suggests
that the parol evidence rule should not bar relief. If the agreement
for commissions had been omitted from the writing- by mistake it
would be given effect in equity through a decree for reformation.
There are no sufficiently persuasive reasons for a different result
because the incorrect expression was intentional. In each case the
trier of the facts must be satisfied that there was such an oral agreement and that this was the agreement the parties meant to put into
effect. The burden of establishing these facts is heavy because the
writing tends to speak for itself, but in the reformation cases this
has led only to an insistence that the evidence be "clear and convincing,"23 n?t to a denial of relief as a matter of law. The same
approach should be taken to a case such as Zell.
This is not to say that the two situations are in substance
. identical, for they are not. The case for relief where there is mistake
is beyond serious dispute. Mistake in expressing 1:he terms of a
written transaction is so common that it would be intolerable to
refuse correction of the writing so as to carry out the transaction
intended. In addition, the fact that the parties attempted to express
their agreement in the writing works in favor of reLef. The proper
solution of a case such as Zell, where this factor is lacking, is more
debatable, yet the similarity in the two situations is such as to suggest that finality should not be attached to the writing in either.
In both situations the party seeking relief from the writing must
establish that the parties reached a certain agreement and that they
intended it to become efl;ective. Since the writing d.oes not express
this agreement there must be a convincing explanation of the discrepancy. This is the purpose of evidence showing a mistake in integration: the affirmative effect of such evidence is to establish that the
oral agreement was meant to be operative. It should be permissible
to establish this ultimate fact by any other type of evidence. When
there is no mistake in integration, any evidence that provides a
rational explanation of the discrepancy is directed toward establishing that the extrinsic agreement was meant to be effective. The
plaintiff's allegations in Zell sought to provide such an explanation,
but four justices of the Supreme Court held in effe,:t that such evidence would be irrelevant. 24 The writing was conclusive. This pre23. See note l supra.
24. The four justices relied on the "applicable state parol evidence rule.'' 322
U.S. 709 (1944). The Second Circuit concluded that Michigan law was applicable and
relied on Woodard v. Walker, 192 Mich. 188, 158 N.W. 846 (1916). That, however, was
a fase in which the court enforced an oral agreement after finding that a later
written contract was a sham, not intended by the parties to have any legal effect,
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sents the central issue, that is, whether the terms of a ·written contract
can of their own force be conclusive, even though the parties did not
intend them to be. Most authority seems to recognize that such force
can be given to words. 25 This does of course tend to support the
stability of business arrangements reduced to writing, but at a cost
when the writing does not express the true or the entire arrangement-and no one really knows how high this cost is.
If the position of the Second Circuit in Zell were to be accepted,
the parol evidence rule would lose much of its significance as a rule
of substantive law. It would become a complicated way of saying
that a court will not enforce an oral agreement that varies from the
writing unless satisfied that there was such an agreement and that
it was meant to be controlling on the point in issue. Some differences
would remain, however, between an intentional and a mistaken variation of the ·writing from the actual agreement, largely with respect
to jury trial. When the case is concerned with the application of the
parol evidence rule, as in Zell, it is commonly said that, even though
the trial is to a jury, the judge is to decide whether the ·writing was
intended by the parties to be the complete and accurate embodiment
of the contract, or of that element of the contract in issue. If the
judge finds there was such an integration, this makes the extrinsic
agreement legally immaterial and the matter does not go to the jury.
If he finds that there was not, he does not decide that there was such
an agreement but merely that if there was it is legally effective; it
is then left to the jury to determine the question of fact. 26
25. Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S. 605 (1915). Thus a "merger" or "integration" clause is usually regarded as conclusive. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 578 (1950);
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 451-52 (1954). As a practical matter the clause will usually be
decisive, but it should be susceptible of contradiction the same as any other term of
the writing. This has been allowed in a few cases, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp. v.
Heckart, 129 Ore. 505, 277 Pac. 821 (1929), where the court gave effect to an oral
warranty on the ground that the statement in the merger clause "was not true." See
also note 39 infra.
26. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule
as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 374-75 (1932). Dean
McCormick would insist on certain minimum evidentiary requirements for making
this initial determination. "Let the trial judge," he suggests, "after hearing the testimony as to the alleged oral agreement, including the evidence of substantiating
circumstances, compare it with the terms of the writing, and if he considers that it
is one which parties situated as these were would 'naturally and normally' have
recited in the writing itself, had they made it and intended it to stand, then he will
reject the evidence thus tentatively heard." McCormick, supra at 379. See also
REs'I'ATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 240 (1932). This would lead, quite unnecessarily, to a
refusal to enforce the oral agreement in Higgs v. de Maziroff, 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E.
555 (1934) (discussed in text accompanying note 13 supra).
McCormick was concerned only with keeping cases that did not satisfy his test
out of the hands of the jury. The test would thus be irrelevant to a case such as Grubb
v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951), where the suit was in equity for specific
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On the other hand, had there been mistake in integration in Zell,
all issues of fact with respect to the making of the oral agreement
and the reason why it was not expressed in the writing would be
in equity under the traditional view. Even under the Second Circuit's formulation of the parol evidence rule in that case, the rule
still applies when there is mistake, since this means that the parties
did intend to embody the agreement in the vrriting. 27 According to
the traditions of the law court the oral agreement was of no legal
significance; only equity gave relief to the injured party through
reformation. 28 Whether the different modes of trial of the fact issues,
dependent on whether the variation was intentional or unintentional, should persist today is another question, to be discussed hereinafter.
Ill.

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE

P AROL

EVIDENCE

RULE AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

In Grubb v. Rockey29 the price stipulated in a written contract
for the sale of land was $10,000, and after the purchaser had paid
performance. In that case, presumably, he would be satisfied to let the judge decide
whether the oral agreement was made and was meant to be controlling. But it seems
unfortunate to preserve a distinction between law and equity to the end that in
equity the contract enforced will be the one made, whereas at law it will sometimes be
the one expressed in the writing. (As to whether the true agreement could be enforced in equity on the facts of Grubb v. Rockey, this depends on the effect of the
statute of frauds and is discussed in the text accompanying note 31 infra.)
27. The rule would still have the effect of turning some questions into questions
of interpretation. If the parties intended to embody their entire agreement in the
writing, and did so without mistake in expression, a difference of opinion over the
meaning of the writing raises only an issue of interpretation. Evidence of what the
parties intended must be directed to explaining the writing, rather than giving effect
to an oral agreement as such. Although it is sometimes difficult to know where interpretation ends and reformation begins, it is submitted that there should be no
gap between the two. That is, if the parties reached an agreement which they meant
to express in the writing, the agreement should be made effective either through
interpretation or reformation. See Sadowski v. General Discount Corp., 81 F. Supp.
381 (E.D. Mich. 1948). Whether there sometimes is such a gap is a puzzling question:
if there is, this probably occurs because of the view that "oral statements by the
parties of what they intended" cannot be used in construing a written contract.
RF.sTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 230 (1932). Any such rule should be rejected. It seems to
have originated in the interpretation of wills, where the testator's "declarations of
intention" are usually regarded as inadmissible. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 543 (1950):
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2471 (3d ed. 1940). Whatever the reasons may be for such an
exclusion, they arise out of the requirements of the statute of wills, and it is a Inistake
to carry the idea over to the interpretation of written contracts.
28. The written contract may not have been in accordance with the intention
of the parties. It may have expressed, by mistake, one consideration, when the
real intention out of Inind at the moment of its execution, was that it should
have expressed another. But, whatever may have been the mistake, or how
produced, it can find no recognition until the written contract shall have been
reformed and made to conform to the intention of the parties, and this, a Court
of Law, cannot effect. A Court of Equity alone can reform a written contract.
Boyce v. Wilson, 32 Md. 122, 129 (1869).
29. 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951).
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that amount he sued for specific performance. The vendor's defense
was that the agreed price was actually $11,200, but that the lower
figure was inserted in the writing to conceal the true price from the
purchaser's family. The trial judge found this to be the agreement
and refused specific performance, but this was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the basis of the parol evidence rule; even
accepting the fact that the actual agreement was for a price of
$11,200, the legally effective contract according to the appellate
court was the one expressed in the writing.
This is of course a rejection of the view that the parol evidence
rule applies only when the parties intended the writing to be a
complete and accurate expression of their entire agreement, or at
least of the term in question. Like Zell it illustrates the thin line
between the case before the court and a case of mistake in integration. Had the parties intended to insert a price of $11,200 in the
writing, the mistaken insertion of the $10,000 figure would by most
authority provide a ground for reformation in favor of the vendor,
leading to the enforcement of their actual agreement instead of the
enforcement of a contract they never made. Mistake is accepted as
an explanation of the discrepancy, but all other explanations are
rejected, no matter how clearly proved and believable they may be.
Had the Pennsylvania court followed the position taken by the
Second Circuit in Zell, the parol evidence rule would not have
barred enforcement of the true agreement, but enforcement would
have been barred by the statute of frauds. At this point there is a
critical difference between the case before the court and the case of
mistake in integration. In the latter, the statute of frauds should not
prevent reformation, since the reformation decree is not an enforcement of the oral agreement. The decree merely corrects the writing;
if enforcement follows either in the same action or in a separate
action it is the written contract as reformed which is being enforced,
not the oral agreement as such.30 On the facts of Grubb v. Rockey,
however, enforcement of the agreed price of $11,200 at suit of the
vendor would be the direct enforcement of an oral term of the
contract and this would be in conflict with the statute of frauds. 31
This does not mean that, in the suit for specific performance
!10. There is considerable diversity of decision on the point but the analysis in the
text is believed to be a correct statement of the role of reformation and finds strong
support in the cases. The general problem is the effect of the statute of frauds on
the reformation of executory contracts and is discussed in Palmer, Reformation and
The Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1967).
lll. It is generally agreed that in a contract for the sale of land the memorandum
required by the statute of frauds must include the price. 2 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 501
(1950).
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brought by the purchaser, the contract should have been enforced
as written, for this is not a permissible application of the statute
of frauds. The effect of the statute is to bar enforcement of various
unwritten agreements, by providing in substance that in order to be
enforceable the agreement must b~ in a prescribed form. It is not
the purpose of the statute to produce enforcement of a "contract"
the parties never made. This is the effect of the parol evidence rule,
as applied by the Pennsylvania court, but it is never a proper consequence of the statute of frauds. 32 Neither the language nor the policy
of the statute supports such a result.
In Grubb v. Rockey the Pennsylvania court should have held
that the vendor had a defense to the purchaser's suit for specific
performance, provided the vendor established the oral agreement
by clear and convincing evidence. The oral agreement would prevent enforcement of the written contract, but the statute of frauds
would prevent enforcement of the oral agreement, leaving the parties
with no enforceable contract for the sale of the land. But the purchaser had paid $10,000 on the price, and should be entitled to
recover this payment in quasi contract unless the vendor is prepared
to perform the oral agreement, as he apparently was in that case.
If so, the probable result would be a completion of the transaction
in accordance with the oral agreement.33
IV.

REFORMATION TO ADD A PROVISION INTENTIONALLY OMITIED

Numerous cases have held that reformation cannot be obtained
so as to add to the writing an extrinsic agreement meant to be
effective but omitted intentionally from the writing. 34 The generally
agreed objective of the remedy is to correct the writing so that it
conforms to the agreement the parties meant to embody in the
writing; mistake in integration is therefore a necessary element
which is lacking in such cases. In Brintnall v. Briggs3 5 the parties
entered into a ·written contract for the sale of a store building and
the stock in trade, and, although the writing was silent on the point,
32. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 498 (1950).
33. This statement slides over some difficult practical problems of judicial ad•
ministration, but is believed to be correct so far as it goes. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 298
(1950).
34. Taylor v. Fowler, 155 Ga. 654, 118 S.E. 212 (1923); Graves v. Greenfiel, 196
Iowa 696, 195 N.W. 252 (1923); Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893);
H. C. Whitmer Co. v. Jordan, 230 Ky. 710, 20 S.W.2d 714 (1929); Holcomb v. Czenkusch,
222 Mich. 376, 192 N.W. 548 (1923); Wilson v. Deen, 74 N.Y. 531 (1878); Saum v.
Orrill, 42 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio App. 1942); Brosnihan v. Brosnihan, 180 Wis. 360, 193 N.W.
74 (1923).
35. 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893).
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the buyer claimed there was a contemporaneous oral agreement by
the seller not to engage in a similar business in the locality. The
buyer sued to reform the writing so as to include this oral agreement
and to recover damages for its breach, but relief was denied. In
deciding against the buyer the court pointed out that he did not
claim the oral agreement was omitted by mistake; thus there was
no basis for reformation, and recovery on the oral agreement would
be "in plain conflict" with the parol evidence rule. Such decisions
rest upon an express or tacit rejection of the view that the parol
evidence rule applies only when the parties intended to integrate
their agreement in the writing. Intentional omission demonstrates
that the provision was not meant to be integrated in the writing, and
a complete acceptance of the view that this makes the parol evidence
rule inapplicable would destroy the need for reformation. 36
Occasionally a court, restive perhaps under the weight of a rule
that denies recognition of the actual agreement, escapes through
the avenue of reformation instead of making a direct attack on the
proper scope of the rule. In a California case37 the plaintiff peach
grower entered into a written contract as a "grower" at a stipulated
price which was the usual price for "grower contracts." In fact,
however, it was understood between the parties that he was to be
treated as a "renter" and receive the higher price incident to "renter
contracts." The court ordered reformation of the contract to comply
with the extrinsic agreement and entered judgment for the sum due
on the contract as reformed. The extrinsic agreement was omitted
from the contract intentionally and the generally accepted basis
for reformation was therefore lacking. At the same time the evidence
showed that the writing was not intended to be a complete and
accurate expression of the agreement. If this of itself makes the parol .
evidence rule inapplicable, as it should, there was nothing to stand
in the way of the enforcement of the oral agreement as such. The
tacit assumption that this could not be done without reformation
rested on the view, seen in many cases, that when the writing has
the appearance of completeness this forecloses further inquiry into
whether the parties intended it as such.38
A few cases have reached the same result by treating the defen36. Again, the separate effect of the statute of frauds must be considered where
the transaction is required to be in writing under that statute. The only way to make
the oral agreement enforceable in such a case is to introduce it into the writing,
but there is no ground for doing so when it was omitted intentionally.
37. Stafford v. California Canning Peach Growers, 11 Cal. 2d 212, 78 P.2d 1150
(19!18).
38. Another example of this use of reformation is Day v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
67 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1933).
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dant's assertion of rights under the writing in breach of his oral
agreement as a fraud on the plaintiff, and then proceeding on the
broad ground that equity will "interfere to prevent the fraudulent
use of a paper for a purpose not contemplated at the time it was
made." 39 Essentially this is a refusal of equity to accept the application of the parol evidence rule so as to deny effect to the actual
agreement. The relief usually takes the form of reformation, but
in one case the court enjoined the defendant from maintaining an
action to enforce the writing in violation of the oral agreement.40
If this is the best that can be done the solution is acceptable, for
equity has asserted a residual power to give relief in the nature of
reformation when there seems to be no other satisfactory way to
prevent a manifest injustice. In these instances, however, the injustice arises because a rule of law is thought to prevent recognition
of an actual agreement. What is needed is a re-examination of the
scope of that rule.
V. THE

A.

ROLES OF LAW AND EQUITY

Mistake in Integration

As we have seen, in cases not involving mistake in integration a
party seeking to avoid application of the parol evidence rule does
so by attempting to establish that the parties did not intend to embody the agreement or some aspect of it in the writing. In reformation cases, on the other hand, it is usually conceded that the parties
did so intend, but the claim is made that the writing is an incorrect
expression of the agreement. As Anglo-American law developed, the
law courts held that the ·writing was controlling, and thus it was left
to equity to give relief through reformation. Under older procedures
the evidence of the extrinsic agreement would be received only
39. Murray v. Dake, 46 Cal. 644, 648 (1873); Wollan v. McKay, 24 Idaho 691, 135
Pac. 832 (1913). This seems as good an explanation as any of Brandwein v. Provident
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693 (1957), where the court had to escape
the effect of both the parol evidence rule (as it conceived the rule) and the statute of
frauds.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the "fraud" label as a reason for holding
the parol evidence rule inapplicable in a law action. International Milling Co. v.
Hachmeister Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955). A written contract not only had
the appearance of completeness but also contained an "integration clause" ("This
contract constitutes the complete agreement between the parties hereto"), but the
court nonetheless gave effect to an extrinsic agreement of the seller that flour was to
conform to certain quality standards. The court's statement that there was fraud in
the making of the contract was not supported by the evidence set forth in the opinion
-it was merely a manipulation of words in order to avoid the undesirable consequences of a rule without re-examining the content of the rule itself.
40. Taylor v. Gilman, 25 Vt. 411 (1853). The consequence was to give effect to the
extrinsic agreement.
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where the pleadings specifically indicated that reformation was
sought:41
Modem procedural reforms have forced courts to refashion the
historic distinction benveen law and equity. In modem procedure
it is coming to be recognized that a formal prayer for reformation
is not needed in order to achieve the results of reformation where
such results are warranted by the facts.42 Hence, if the plaintiff seeks
a money judgment to which he would be entitled under the actual
agreement, but the written contract varies from this agreement, it
would seem that he should recover when he pleads and proves the
facts that provide a basis for reformation, even though his complaint
is not in the form of a bill in equity containing a prayer for such
relief.48 Once this is recognized, it seems that parol evidence has
been admitted in a law action to vary the terms of the writing. As
to what, if anything, is left of the distinction between law and equity,
the chief question has related to jury trial.
On the facts just described, where a party seeks affirmative relief
justified only if the writing is reformed, there is general agreement
that the issue of mistake is equitable, with no constitutional right to
jury trial in most states.44 This does not of course settle the question
whether trial of the issue should be by court or jury when other
issues in the case are being tried by jury. The question is one to be
worked out by legislation or judicial decision, unless the jurisdiction
is one of the few in which there is said to be a constitutional right
41. Forsythe v. Kimball, 91 U.S. 291 (1875); Goldband v. Allen, 245 Mass. 143, 139
N.E. 834 (1923); Van Syck.el v. Dalrymple, 32 N.J. Eq. 233 (Ch. 1880); Vermont Marble
Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 Atl. 151 (1917).
42. United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 210 F.2d 462, 465 (2d
Cir. 1954); Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1951)
(dictum); Del Rio Bank & Trust Co. v. Cornell, 57 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1932): Metro•
politan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Friedley, 79 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Hayes v. Flesher,
34 Idaho 13, 198 Pac. 678 (1921) (suit in equity); Cox v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 172
Miss. 841, 160 So. 741 (1935); First Nat'l Bank v. Oppenheimer, 123 Wash. 290, 212
Pac. 164 (1923).
An example of dogged insistence on adherence to outmoded procedure is Blay v.
Pollard, [19!10] 1 K.B. 628 (C.A.), where one reason given for reversing a judgment
allowing mistake in integration as a defense was that the defendant's pleadings did not
include a prayer for reformation.
43. Calton v. Lewis, 119 Ind. 181, 21 N.E. 475 (1889); Ragsdale v. Turner, 141 Iowa
604, 120 N.W. 109 (1909); Dahlhjelm Garages v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 149 Wash. 184,
270 Pac. 434 (1928). Contra, Farquhar v. Farquhar, 194 Mass. 400, 80 N.E. 654 (1907).
Recovery in quasi contract is regularly allowed where the purchaser of land in a
sale by the acre has overpaid due to a deficiency in acreage. Usually the contract will
call for a lump sum price so that proof of the basis of the sale comes from extrinsic
evidence and recovery of the overpayment rests essentially on reformation of the
price term. The parol evidence problem goes largely unnoticed. Cases are collected in
Annot., 153 A.L.R. 4, at 19 (1944).
44. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1948). Reformation
was denied when the case was tried on the merits, 98 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. W. Va. 1951).
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to a non-jury trial of equitable issues. 45 Under the usual procedure
trial will be by the court, 46 but this is not the universal practice.
In a Nebraska case, for example, the action was to recover for the
loss by fire of buildings allegedly insured by the defendant, but one
of the buildings was on land not described in the policy. It was held
within the trial court's authority to let the whole case go to the jury,
including proof of mistake in integration, and a judgment in favor
of the insured as though the policy had been reformed was affirmed. 47
The relation between law and equity has arisen most frequently
where mistake in integration was asserted as a defense to an action
at law. The widespread allowance of equitable defenses at law48
means that the reformation issue will be decided in the single action.
Most courts follow the view that the mode of trial developed in
equity should be employed for the equitable issue, 49 but until
recently New York was a notable exception. In an action to recover
money due under the terms of a written contract the court of
appeals held that the defendant could introduce evidence to establish a different agreement which the writing failed to express because
of mistake, with all the evidence to go to the jury.50 There are occasional instances of a similar practice in other states. 51
Such decisions suggest a need for re-examining the policies behind the parol evidence rule. Beginning with Thayer's classic analysis
in 189852 attention became centered on the rule as one of substantive
law until McCormick pointed to its importance as a "procedural
45. Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157 (1953); Note, The
Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
46. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 91-110 (2d ed. 1947); JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.7 (1965);
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 38.16, .22 (2d ed. 1966).
47. Central Granaries Co. v. Nebraska Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 106 Neb. 80,
182 N.W. 582 (1921). In actions on insurance policies there are many cases that could
be analyzed as calling for reformation which in fact are settled in a law action through
applying the concept of estoppel. VANCE, INSURANCE 513-47 (3d ed. 1951). Estoppel is
also sometimes used in other situations. Schlosser v. Nicholson, 184 Ind. 283, Ill N.E.
13 (1916). See also the Pennsylvania cases cited in note 56 infra.
48. Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1059, 1112
(1957).
49. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Strickland, 187 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1951); CLARK,
CODE PLEADING 103-06, 621-28 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code,
11 CORNELL L.Q. 482 (1926).
50. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381 (1925).
Three of the seven judges dissented, without opinion. Accord, Bugen v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 408 Pa. 472, 184 A.2d 499 (1962).
51. Zuspann v. Roy, 102 Kan. 188, 170 Pac. 387 (1918); Bugen v. New York Life
Ins. Co., supra note 50.
52. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ch. IO (1898). See also Thayer,
The "Parol Evidence" Rule, 6 HARv. L. REv. 325 (1893). Thayer's analysis was accepted
by Wigmore. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940).
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device for control of the jury." 53 For cases of mistake in integration
the effect of the rule was to avoid what he described as:
[the] grave danger that honest expectations, based upon carefully
considered written transactions, may be defeated through the sympathetic, if not credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated or wishborn oral agreement. Likewise, some peril to justice and to the
stability of business transactions lies in the possibility that earlier
and tentative oral agreements which were part of the preliminary
parleying, but were actually understood by both parties to be
abandoned when omitted in the final written agreement, will be
stoutly asserted by one party at the trial as having been intended
to stand alongside the writing. When a genuine, but superseded,
oral agreement is thus set up, it will be even harder for the jury to
reject the claim based on such agreement than if it were fabricated
from the whole cloth.54

Although this danger was recognized by the New York Court of
AppeaJs, 55 it cannot be said that the court was expressing a preference for leaving the issues to the jury despite the danger; rather,
the decision rested wholly on the court's construction of a provision
of the procedure code. To guard against the danger, Judge Cardozo
said, there should be a "strict enforcement" of the rule applied in
equity with respect to the weight of the evidence needed to overcome the writing. That is, the evidence must be "clear and convincing," or as Cardozo expressed it "of the clearest and most satisfactory character." Even with this safeguard, which it is difficult to
make effective,56 it seems wise to preserve for most cases the historic
mode of trial of equity issues. It may be largely a historical accident
that the separate jurisdictions of law and equity sometimes had a
53. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of
the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
54. Id. at 367. Dean McCormick was describing the dangers involved where there
is no claim of mistake, but his description is also apt where there is such a claim.
55. "Juries may find it difficult to apply the presumption that preliminary treaties
are merged in the written contract if they are permitted to consider such treaties as
evidence of mistake." Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Andersen 8c Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 296, 146
N.E. 381, 385 (1925).
56. Note, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 396, 400 (1926). In Bugen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 408
Pa. 472, 184 A.2d 499 (1962), where the issue of mistake in integration was submitted
to a jury, the appellate court said that the evidence "must be clear, convincing, and
of the most satisfactory character," but there is no indication that such an instruction
was given the jury. Presumably, however, such an instruction is called for in Pennsylvania. Broida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 Atl. 492 (1934). Where there are
other questions of fact in the case, it may be unsatisfactory to submit the whole case
to the jury with a set of instructions presenting different standards of proof on the
different issues. This apparently was done in Zuspann v. Roy, 102 Kan. 188, 170 Pac.
387 (1918).
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rational relation to the different modes of trial,117 but as McCormick
suggests there is such a relation here.
The New York practice has been changed in that state's new
Civil Practice Law by providing that "equitable defenses and equitable counterclaims shall be tried by the court." 118 This creates a
statutory right to a non-jury trial. There are instances in which the
correction of a manifest error has been allowed in a law action without any need perceived for separating the legal and equitable
issues.59 The New York legislation should not interfere with the
sensible administration of such cases.
B. Intentional Variation

There is also need for examination of the manner of trial where
no mistake in integration is claimed. As we have seen, it is commonly
stated that the parol evidence rule applies only when the parties
intended to embody in the writing either the entire agreement or
at least that part with respect to which the extrinsic evidence is
relevant. No one doubts that there are times when this question of
intent will be decided on all the evidence. The principal difference
of opinion is over whether this will be done when the writing seems
on its face to be either a complete expression of the agreement or
at least a final expression of the term in issue. Thoughtful writers
have argued that this question of intention is to be decided by the
judge,60 and there is substantial judicial recognition of the theoretical
soundness of this view.61 The theory is sometimes difficult to apply,
although this tends to be obscured by the usual way of stating the
57. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (1965). The text of this part of Professor James'
book appears also in James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655,
661 (1963).
58. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 4101.
59. Brilliant v. Silk, 290 Mass. 537, 195 N.E. 737 (1935); Schultz v. Charleston, 261
Ill. App. 51 (1931). Other cases are cited in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACI'S § 1599 (rev. ed. 1937).
In England it is said that "both Courts of law and of equity may correct an obvious
mistak~ on the face of an instrument without the slightest difficulty." Wilson v.
Wilson, [1854] 5 H.L.C. 40, 66, 10 Eng. Rep. 811, 822.
60. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940); Harvey, The Use of Parol Evidence in
Cases Involving Written Instruments, 34 Mich. St. B.J., No. 5, pp. 8, 16 (1955);
McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury,
41 YALE L.J. 365, 374-75 (1932). See also note 26 supra.
61. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); McDonnell v.
General News Bureau, 93 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1937); South Florida Lumber Mills v.
Breuchaud, 51 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1931); Brown v. Oliver, 123 Kan. 711, 256 Pac. 1008
(1927); Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924). Contra, Jarvis v.
Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 99. A.2d 126 (1953). The usual way of stating the position
that the issue is for the court is in terms of admissibility of evidence: "The question
is one for the court, for it relates to the admission or rejection of evidence." Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331, 339 (Ct. App. 1882).
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problem, that is, in terms of intent to integrate. 62 The real issues
are whether the parties made the agreement in question and whether
they meant it to be effective despite the writing. According to the
aforementioned theory of the judge's function, he is to assume for
purposes of decision that the agreement was made and then to decide
whether it was intended to be effective.Ga But in many instances the
two issues are virtually inseparable. It is not a hypothetical case
that is up for decision but an actual case, to be decided on all the
evidence.
In Grubb v. Rockey,G4 where the writing specified a price of
$10,000 but the vendor claimed that the true oral agreement was
for $11,200, it would be difficult psychologically for the judge to
decide that the parties intended an oral agreement, if there was one,
to be effective, without also deciding that the parties made such an
agreement. In the converse situation it will often be feasible for
the judge to decide that, even though such an agreement was made,
it was not intended to be effective when the writing was signed.
In other instances however, if the judge decides that no such agreement was to be effective he will also have decided that no such agreement was made.fi 5 In the Grubb case, instead of trying to make such
a difficult provisional judgment, the court took the easy way out by
attaching an unwarranted finality to the written word. This may
well explain the judicial tendency to make conclusive an appearance
of completeness in the instrument. Thereby the court avoids the
necessity of deciding an issue of fact that is conceived to be outside
its province. This keeps the issue from the jury in situations where
the court would decide, given the chance, that there was no such
extrinsic agreement as one party claims. Unfortunately, however, it
means also that courts have declared themselves powerless to give
effect to actual agreements no matter how clear the evidence of
agreement. In a case such as Grubb v. Rockey the court should in
62. Thus, in South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breucbaud, 51 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.
1931), the issue stated was "whether the matter sought to be orally proven has been
integrated in the written agreement, by ascertaining from the conduct and language of
the parties, and the surrounding circumstances, what was their intent."
63. If he decides that the transaction was covered by the writing, he does not
decide that the excluded negotiations did not take place, but merely that if
they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial. If he decides that
the transaction was not intended to be covered by the writing, he does not
decide that the negotiations did take place, but merely that if they did, they are
legally effective, and he then leaves to the jury the determination of fact
whether they did take place.
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940).
64. See note 29 supra.
65. An example is South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breuchaud, 51 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.
1931).
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the first instance decide both questions. If it finds no oral agreement
which was meant to be effective that ends the matter. Decision of
the issues without a jury presents no serious constitutional question
since there has been at most a trial of issues that previously went
untried. 66 If the court finds that there was an oral agreement which
the parties meant to be effective, the evidence can go to the jury
with final power to decide. 67

VI.

CONCLUSION

From one point of view the relation of the parol evidence rule to
mistake in integation can be put quite simply. The rule does not
bar reformation when there is clear and convincing evidence that
terms of an agreement meant to be included in the writing were
misstated or omitted by mistake. But reformation is not available
to insert terms which the parties intentionally omitted.
When the problems of the parol evidence rule are viewed from
the reformation side, by comparing results reached where the discrepancy between the ·writing and the true· agreement was unintentional with the results reached where it was intentional, some widely
accepted applications of the rule seem unsatisfactory. There are differences in the two situations but they are insufficient to warrant
the marked disparity of results. The disparity should be eliminated
so as to permit recognition of the actual agreement when the court
is satisfied that this was the agreement. The parol evidence rule
should not be used so as to enforce a contract the parties never made,
when this is known to be the case.
66. This is what occurs when the court holds the writing conclusive and the
extrinsic evidence therefore "inadmissible."
67. The jury could find there was no oral agreement even though the judge had
decided otherwise in letting the evidence go to the jury. Whether the jury's finding is
sufficiently supported by the evidence would be tested by the usual standard.

